Industrial and infrastructure enterprises face risks that go far beyond standard equipment failures: supply chain disruptions, cyber threats, incidents at neighboring facilities, and local security factors require a shift from ad-hoc "firefighting" to systemic resilience. When an emergency escalates rapidly, fragmented reliability procedures cannot prevent chaos in decision-making. Aleksandr Kuzin, Business Continuity Manager at OTEKO, examines the practice of building a unified business continuity and crisis response architecture within a port and industrial cluster.
The starting point of the project in late 2023 was the development of a proprietary five-level maturity scale for continuity processes. Initially, the company was at a fragmented level: critical equipment and spares were identified, but there was no company-wide standard or proactive resource allocation. The goal was to transition to a measurable level with standardized policies and management oversight.
To assess the enterprise's vulnerability, a Business Impact Analysis (BIA) was conducted: revenue-generating processes were inventoried, and the cost of each minute of downtime, potential fines, and safety risks were calculated. Following interviews with process owners, a criticality map was created, categorizing operations by Maximum Tolerable Period of Disruption—from the most vulnerable (less than a week before a crisis hits) to resilient (with a safety margin of up to a month). This enabled a well-grounded prioritization of resources.
An analysis of 32 core processes and critical resources divided them into three readiness zones:
Plan viability is tested through three types of exercises: tabletop exercises (when extended downtime or upgrades are required), full-cycle drills during scheduled maintenance turnarounds, and priority live drills during normal operations. Testing within a live production environment is what uncovers hidden organizational barriers. For instance, while testing a control room failure, it was discovered that the operator supposed to perform a direct connection via the switchgear room lacked the required electrical safety qualification level. Eliminating such discrepancies before a real incident occurs makes the plans practical and actionable.
A crisis management vertical was established to handle the nine critical areas and external threats. The company defined its own crisis criteria and an escalation scale that tracks an emerging event before it enters an acute phase, and appointed crisis managers from top management to synchronize operations between Moscow and Taman.
The list of threats—ranging from industrial and environmental safety to regulatory and HR risks—was broken down into 35 scenarios. The crisis management team, comprising permanent and rotating members, included only active managers and specialists with hands-on knowledge of ground-level processes: operations and maintenance, HSE, environmental protection, fire safety, information and corporate security, commercial operations, logistics, and HR.
Two-day simulations lasting 4 hours per day became the primary tool for testing the crisis team. During four exercises (an infrastructure attack, a hazardous material leak at a neighboring facility, a cyberattack, and a port blackout), participants were not given the scenarios in advance, and top executives were deliberately removed from the process to test the readiness of their deputies and the transmission of commands down to frontline personnel. This highlighted bottlenecks: for example, during a mass evacuation drill, it was discovered that the bus evacuation plan failed to account for the simultaneous evacuation of employees from neighboring facilities along the same single access road. Following the simulations, alternative routes were mapped out, PPE and firefighting equipment were procured, more than 40 out of 100 action items were implemented—reducing on-site evacuation time to three minutes—and an annual budget for crisis management measures was approved.