Declaring safety as a top priority has long been the standard for large industrial enterprises. However, regular self-assessments and root-cause analyses of near misses often expose a gap between corporate values and actual on-site behavior. One of the key reasons is an unbalanced incentive system: when requirements are formulated too broadly, frontline supervisors in some shops rely solely on disciplinary action, while in others they distribute targeted bonuses equally among all employees regardless of their actual contribution to occupational safety. In his presentation, Dmitriy Stepanyuk, Expert (Psychologist) at Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant, examines the practice of transitioning from fragmented incentives to a unified "Employee Safety Motivation Procedure."
To revise existing approaches, the plant established a cross-functional working group comprising representatives from HR, the Chief Engineer's Office, the Inspection Department, and Internal Communications. To eliminate subjectivity, the specialists translated the concept of mindfulness into concrete behavioral markers, dividing them into indicators of commitment and non-commitment to safety culture.
In practice, these criteria operate across three processes: incident investigation (to determine the degree of employee accountability), behavioral safety audits (to provide constructive feedback), and employee training programs. All identified facts are logged into a centralized information system.
The motivation toolkit is divided into financial and non-financial blocks in accordance with the Labor Code of the Russian Federation. Financial levers—individual allowances, regular bonuses, and targeted awards—work both upward and downward. The non-financial framework includes certificates of appreciation, coverage in internal media, nominations to the talent pool, additional professional development, and early removal of previously imposed disciplinary sanctions for contributions to safety.
An important methodological feature of this practice is the quarterly calculation of the incentive balance for each department. Summary tables track every instance of reward (up to several hundred per quarter) and sanction (several dozen), after which two ratios are analyzed: the ratio of rewards to punishments, and the share of financial versus non-financial measures. This breakdown reveals managerial biases. For example, when 2025 analytics showed a predominance of sanctions in one of the shops, the supervisor received coaching on working with motivational mechanisms—and over the first nine months of 2026, the unit's statistics balanced out.
The foundation of transparency at Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant is the Just Culture principle applied to tracking minor (low-level) events. If an employee voluntarily and promptly reports an error they made or an issue they identified, no disciplinary measures are taken, and a reward may be granted. Conversely, if a violation is concealed and later uncovered by an inspection or management, administrative or financial penalties follow.
During the discussion, Dmitriy Stepanyuk elaborated on the safeguards that protect the system from manipulation and bias:
Administering the program with a team of two to three specialists has already yielded measurable results: the number of events proactively reported by employees has grown by more than 20%, and inquiries to safety culture representatives have increased by 50% since 2024. Plans for 2027 include automating data collection from corporate systems, breaking down analytics to the level of frontline supervisors, and incorporating commitment indicators into comprehensive psychophysiological assessments of personnel reliability.